150 STCL, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1988) nizable from a multitude of events (or, properly speaking, non-events) and unnoticed. In order to answer these questions, I would like to perform an Oulipian experiment myself. 4 Indeed, the very fact that such a notion of "Oulipian experiment" exists, that I can mention the term, that I can extract a model from their experiments and reverse it unto their own work, indicates that there is something in the body of their work which is akin to a "message." The experiment that I shall perform is a little removed from Oulipo ( although, as we will see a bit later, the choice is far from arbitrary), but is instead inspired by the famous biologist Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity.' Monod imagines a probe sent to Earth from Mars to determine rules by which natural objects can be differentiated from man-made ones and, through these rules, to make sense of terrestrial biological forms in general. Like
Monod's probe, we can approach an exotic place -Oulipo -which sputters information, but whose message we are unable to decipher. The Oulipian products we receive are monstrosities, just like the twoheaded snakes or the little men with antennae that our collective imagination has until recently encountered on unknown planets. Oulipian messages are for now incomprehensible and very much akin to earthly messages for the Martian probe. It is our ambition, however, to see if they contain any meaning that escapes us because of the rules we are accustomed to using. We could, perhaps, take the place of Monod's Martian probe, examine Oulipian products and attempt to construct a set of rules that may make some kind of sense of these products.
Let us look at one of those Oulipian/Martian products, given to us as a piece of literature. We will of course assume that our probe could differentiate between a literary and non-literary product at least in their formal appearance:
Vin sur l' eau On a exploite le fleuve du ciel de la mer. Des miroirs de grosse salle. Le cheveu se trouve permis dans l'aube de soie. Le crepuscule neige s'englobe sur l'homme de celui-ci, celui-la c'est dans le plaisir de l'heure. Un rouge gobelet recouvre autour des lunes claires. Ciel, dons, vents et onces donnent pouvoir r or de mouton clair. Dans ce boeuf-la le plaisir n' appliquait pas. 6 2 First we notice that it has the appearance of a prose poem: a short prose piece with a title, a beginning and an end. If we consider it as a prose poem, we can adopt an approach, venture an interpretation. There is no need to "explain" it thoroughly; it is sufficient to show that an interpretive effort allows us to lower its level of absurdity. The piece is indeed semantically very rich. The "Yin" and "Eau" of the title remind us that wine is diluted with water ("couper le vin avec de l'eau "). "Yin sur l'eau," wine on water, blood on water. this is not very far from Baudelaire's "Le soleil s'est noye dans son sang qui se fige." The first lines: "On a exploite le fleuve du ciel de la mer. Des miroirs de grosse salle" are semantically harmonious. "Les fleuves du ciel" could be passing clouds which echo this sentence of Max Jacob: "un grand fleuve traversait le ciel.'" "Fleuve" and "mer" belong to the same semantic field, and the resemblance between the sky and the sea is somewhat of a poetic cliché. The sea reflects the sky, as do, perhaps, the "miroirs de grosse salle." Continuing a little more: "Le cheveu se trouve permis dans l'aube de sole" reminds us of the expression "le cheveu dans la soupe," the agent of disturbance. Perhaps what is disturbed here is the harmony between the sky and the sea. The end of the sentence confirms this: "le cheveu se trouve permis dans l'aube de soie," the hair disturbs the silkiness of dawn. "Le crepuscule neige .": "crepuscule" recalls "aube" and "neige" recalls "soie," and soon. But let's stop here. It is evident that the interpretation could go on, almost undisturbed, with the help of what we can bring to the text literary allusions, our own cultural background, clichés, and some sort of interconnection between the elements. We could also imagine reducing its level of absurdity ( and increasing its coherence) by seeing in it a development or a drama, by making it describe an "etat d' 'Arne," by transforming it into a surrealist text or a quasi-Mallarmean poem. Were the author known, we could further relate the images to biographical data and then do a full-fledged psychocritical analysis. The point is that we can always reconstruct meaning, make up a story or construct an interpretive model from a set of data (in this case, admittedly quite beautiful data) which could give something of a poetic message to whomever wanted to invest some work.
(somewhat "Martian" or "Earthly" depending on your position) and extremely out of the ordinary in the little town of Fenchurch St The level of absurdity of this text is much lower than that of the target text ("Yin sur l'eau"); it is much more coherent but, by the same token, semantically much poorer, since it would allow much less "interpretation." It tells the story of a failed picnic, one that is easily recognizable and one that we have probably all experienced. We receive its message much more readily because the degree of improbability it contains is low, much lower than that of the target text. If we were to consider only the titles, "Yin sur l'eau" is much more improbable than "Dejeuner sur l'herbe," which, to anyone who knows a little art history, is a cliché that, as it turns out, adds very little information. Let us remember, however, one of the basic principles of information theory which states that the more improbable a message is, the more information it contains. If I walk into a room on a rainy day and declare that it is raining outside, my declaration does not contain much information since my audience already has that knowledge. If, however, I declare on a day in the middle of July something highly improbable (in the usual as in the mathematical sense) for the situation, such as "it is snowing outside," the message becomes very informative if it is actually snowing or absurd if it is not. The same probably holds true in literature. Consider, for example, the phrase:
"La marquise sortit a cinq heures." Because this phrase and all its variants had become a highly probable cliché for the novel, Breton rejected it, preferring to fabricate metaphors by joining together two terms that were as far apart as possible. The farther apart the two terms, the greater the "etincelle poetique." Or in other words, the more improbable the conjunction of the two terms, the greater the poetic message. This is not to say, however, that because of its high level of probability relative to "Yin sur l'eau," "Dejeuner sur l'herbe" is totally devoid of information. It is poor only relative to "Vin sur l'eau." Nor does this imply that it is devoid of meaning. On the contrary, we readily recognize and assimilate its meaning; compared to the other text it just does not have as much information and we can say that its news factor is somewhat low. If, however, we place it in a context, real or fabricated, its information and meaning increase proportionately as we construct the context. If we know, for example, that it is a passage from a novel (it is in fact a paragraph from Raymond Queneau's Les Enfants du Limon), it too could become rich in information. It could translate, for example, the anguish of the organizer of the picnic, or the snobbish attitude of the narrator towards those who practice "le campigne." A more interesting and richer reading (from the point of view of information theory) could show this passage as the metaphor for the tendency of any organization to deteriorate, to slide down the entropic scale. This is "more" interesting, "more" informative, because picnics and thermodynamics have little to do with one another and yet, just as in the surrealist metaphor, their conjunction is quite meaningful and informative. In other words, the complexity and the degree of Published by New Prairie Press information of this passage are, in certain ways, the product of the work of the reader, the product of the relationships she or he establishes between the text and a context, whether real or imaginary.
We can now bring a qualification to our first hypothesis: if the Oulipian message is in work, that work consists in establishing relationships, either contextual, as in "Dejeuner sur l'herbe" or intertextual, as we began to see in "Vin sur l' eau."
If the Oulipian message is to be located in the relationships, then no doubt we must consider the source-text (A: "Dejeuner sur l'herbe") and the target-text (B: "Vin sur l'eau") as one set, the text AB, necessarily more complex and richer from the point of view of information than A alone or B alone. 9 Considering AB as one set, we notice that from A to B there is syntactical redundancy: the constructions, sentence by sentence, are identical. Moreover, personal pronouns occupy identical positions in both and are identical except when an agreement is necessary. The verbs are different, but their tenses are the same. They occupy the same position in both texts and they are used in example, examine what kind of words in B take the place of words in A. We could perhaps fmd some kind of coherence in the substitutions. Or we may discover that one is the coded translation of the other, just like Sayers' cryptogram. But suffice it to say that, systemically speaking, there must be something which is neither A nor B, which is not contained in either A or B, yet which intervenes between them in order to produce one from the other. This intervention could be our imagination or, as in a cryptogram, the work of formal constraints. To look at it differently, if we imagine that B is supposed to be a copy of A, we recognize that an interference, or noise, has been introduced into the system which transformed certain elements of A to produce B, exactly as in the genetic manipulations Oulipians are fond of evoking."
A further qualification of our starting hypothesis is now necess ary: we said that the Oulipian message is in the work which goes into the establishment of the relationship between different elements. We must now add that this work has all the characteristics of an interference. Information theory has established that order came from noise. Oulipo adds-along with all of literature, perhaps-that noise, or interference, is work.
Up to this point we have proceeded (like Monod) as though we did not know which constraints were used to transform A into B. We have seen that, theoretically, we could invent them. Let us consider a new set A + B + C, C being the actual constraints, as they are spelled out by Oulipo, which permitted the transformation from A to B. C, the recipe, is quite simple: take a text, empty it of all its nouns, adjectives and verbs, and what remains is a texte prepare. Replace the nouns, adjectives and verbs by those taken from three other texts. Then adjust slightly the resultant text ("add salt and pepper to taste") we could argue that all five texts (the source, the target and the three intervening texts) are the chimeras-in all its meanings-of each other. Which is the prepare (gutted) and which is the accommode (stuffed) or which text is the stuffing will depend on the choice made by the observer. Nothing, moreover, would prevent him or her from doing a permutation and coming up with five factorial sets (one hundred and twenty, to be precise) analogous to the set ABC.
There remains the question of chance in the choice of the components of C (the choice of the interfering texts and the constraints). I would like to argue that chance plays only a very small part in this game. First, as we have seen, work is at the basis of the transformation. One way to define work, in terms of thermodynamics, is in opposition to chance. In effect, a steam engine produces anti-chance: it canalizes hot molecules to drive a piston. Of course, the canalization is not complete, as there is still a great amount of energy that is lost, of "noise" that is produced. who use computers, they are similar to the word processing program with which we can write a recipe book or a dissertation on Lucretius. ) The constraints are also quasi-absolute, as we cannot start performing a chimera and half-way through change to another oulipism, just as we could not start making a stew and half-way through change to a recipe for steak au poivre. In other words, we process A in a certain and definite way to obtain B. These constraints, which are a form of redundancy, ensure that a given transformation is performed rather than any other transformation. They fight chance. They control and canalize the transformation of A into B.
Redundancy is a notion not only familiar to information theorists One could still object that the interfering texts were chosen haphazardly. But we could argue the contrary. These texts are indeed foreign to A and quite removed from it, but they were not totally aleatory choices. You or I most probably would have chosen different texts because of our different cultures, interests, tastes and preoccupations, or because of the different books that happened to be on our desks. We could also imagine the choice as being in accordance with the result we would like to accomplish: more or less abstract, more or less poetic, technical or exotic. We can be fairly certain that the author of this chimera had considered several choices (choose your ingredients well!) before deciding upon these three. His choice has been something of his signature. The proof of that signature, of the uniqueness of each resultant text, is to be found in another oulipian exercise where an "homosyntaxisme" (the so-called "generic" term for the chimera) was performed by several different Oulipians and the results were totally different for each one (Oulipo, . This is not proof of chance. Rather each different text is the proof of the individual necessity of a signature. Each participant filled the syntactic structure his own way for different reasons and toward different goals and, as such, each text bears the signature of its author.
As Oulipo has amply shown, they were not the first to We continue to read them, we laugh, we are fascinated, we share them with our friends and we want to read more of them. With the reading of each new exercise, the message becomes increasingly trite and secondary; the information, on the other hand, becomes richer and incites us to action (laughter, reading more, etc.). Queneau has, in effect, managed to transform information into message. This is, perhaps, the monstrosity-the chimera-of the Oulipian message: information and message are one and the same. We move thus to the tickling of a second level of abstraction: the different forms of a single message are, in themselves, the message. The hypothesis we have established (work, the establishment of relationships, interference) are not contradicted because that work, whether it be performed by the reader or writer or both, is always in the order of formal constraints. The Oulipian message is formal. These formal messages incite to action since we are presently talking, thinking, writing about Oulipo, and also because the entire Oulipian project is programmatic: it is an invitation to use constraints to write.16 Post-Scriptum:
What I tried to accomplish here could very well be called an Oulipo-critique. It follows closely a homosyntaxism. I indeed took an Oulipo product and a body of knowledge quite removed from it, biology and information theory. I then "folded" one into the other in order to get an essay (this one) quite different from them but which says, hopefully, something about Oulipo's message. I have, thus, performed exactly what I was trying to demonstrate. But something strange happened on the way: in order to study Oulipian products, my probe (and I) had, in effect, to take its method from these same products. The probe (and I), was overtaken by the products it was studying, it reorganized itself to the image of the very thing it was studying and became, itself (and I, with it), a chimera. 
